Nuclear Proliferation

Tuesday, October 17, 2006

UN Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006)

The Meat and Potatoes of UN Resolution 1718
The sanctions againt the People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
Article added on October 15 and updated on October 16, 2006:

8. Decides that:

(a) all Member States shall prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(i) any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms, or related materiel including spare parts, or items as determined by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 12 below (the Committee);

(ii) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, unless within 14 days of adoption of this resolution the Committee has amended or completed their provisions also taking into account the list in document S/2006/816, as well as other items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined by the Security Council or the Committee, which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes;

(iii)luxury goods;

(b) the DPRK shall cease the export of all items covered in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from the DPRK by their nationals, or using their flagged vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of the DPRK;

(c) all Member States shall prevent any transfers to the DPRK by their nationals or from their territories, or from the DPRK by its nationals or from its territory, of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in subparagraphs (a) (i) and (a) (ii) above;

(d) all Member States shall, in accordance with their respective legal processes, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of the adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the persons or entities designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being engaged in or providing support for, including through other illicit means, DPRK’s nuclear-related, other weapons of mass destruction-related and ballistic missile-related programmes, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities;

(e) all Member States shall take the necessary steps to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for, including through supporting or promoting, DPRK policies in relation to the DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, together with their family members, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a state to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

(f) in order to ensure compliance with the requirements of this paragraph, and thereby preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery and related materials, all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary;

“9. Decides that the provisions of paragraph 8 (d) above do not apply to financial or other assets or resources that have been determined by relevant States:

(a) to be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets and economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) to be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee; or

(c) to be subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgement, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgement provided that the lien or judgement was entered prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person referred to in paragraph 8 (d) above or an individual or entity identified by the Security Council or the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant States to the Committee;

“10. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 8 (e) above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

“11. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within thirty days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 above;

....

Wednesday, October 11, 2006

It's Not So Much about Who Kim Is,

. . .as it's about who George Bush is.

My gut reaction with Kim Jong Il is that he is a totally fooked up totalitarian bastard for whom it's difficult not to add the attribution of EVIL. But what other appellation is more accurate? For someone who purposely/purposelessly starves masses of his own people? But's that just my personal -- very personal -- distaste for Kim. Were I a political decision-maker in the political hierarchy or bureaucracy of a nation-state, I would be irresponsible to allow my personal feelings to affect my policies.


Studies of strategic options completed during the Clinton administration concluded that any military strike against the North would court massive retaliation causing enough unbelievable devastation of the most populated areas of South Korea that they were unthinkable. I don't think the parameters have changed in six years, unless they've become even more adverse.

No one likes extortion. On the international (inter-nation) level it is especially unpalatable. But that's the apparent strategic concept of the Pyongyang government: use starvation as a means of suppression, and use nuclear blackmail to force the international community to prop up the resulting unsustainable economy.

Again, trying mightily to hold my personal disgust of Kim in check, with the military option off the table, I might entertain anything from an embargo to a total of blockade of North Korea. Greater starvation condensed into a short term might be morally defensible if it promised eventual regime change in the near or intermediate term. Furthermore, mass suffering starvation wouldn't be augmented by bunker-busting, dumb-bombing, would it? However, who's to say what level of provocation will tip Kim Jong Il into launching an assault on South Korea with his conventional artillery-tipped million-man army? Even mild economic sanctions might not be all that promising, either, huh?

Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman suggest that North Korea Isn't (Really) Our Problem. They say The U.S., overstretched already, should treat Kim Jong Il as a regional crisis and let China take the lead:
The United States is bogged down in what appears to be an unwinnable war in Iraq; it is facing very unpleasant options in regard to neighboring Iran's nuclear program; senior NATO officers say that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating fast; in the former Soviet Union, Georgia and Russia are moving toward military confrontation, with the U.S. seemingly unable to restrain either; in large swaths of Latin America, new nationalist and populist movements are challenging U.S. interests.

And now the totalitarian regime in North Korea has defied the international community by testing a nuclear bomb — and the U.S. appears to have neither military nor effective economic measures with which to respond.

If all this does not prove the reality of American overreach, what does? If U.S. power is to be placed on a firmer basis, its exercise must be more limited. Certain commitments will have to be scaled back or even eliminated if the U.S. is to be able to concentrate on dealing with its most truly vital challenges and enemies.

. . . . North Korea must be treated as a regional problem to be managed by a regional concert of powers, with China in the lead. The U.S. role in all this should be sympathetic — and distant.
Translation: The United States is no longer the unchallenged world superpower it was in 2000. Squandering its vast economic, diplomatic, moral and military assets in Iraq -- an un-provoked, unnecessary, largely unilateral invasion and unplanned occupation of Iraq (UULUIUOI) -- our once great country is now a second-rate power. With our military efforts in Afghanistan (that one forced upon us) and Iraq eroding under our brave soldiers' boots, this administration and its Pentagon cannot credibly claim it can fight two (or more) wars anywhere in the world. We will have to concede this and perhaps other crises to other world powers, like China.

My fellow Americans will struggle, as I have, with accepting this fate. Their reckoning will be delayed by the pretenses of our misleaders, (Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld) who are still living in the pre-UULUIUOI world: They have drawn their lines in the sands (repeatedly) against two members of their Axis of Evil, Iran and North Korea: cross this line (or that line) of proliferation, they have said, and there will be consequences, because this or that is not to be tolerated. Only, when these lines are crossed, there are no consequences, but only more veiled (unspecified) threats: "all options are on the table." This unrealistic level of grandiosity is what LTE referred to when he blurted out, De Nile is a tributary of de Potomac. That America is now second-rate power is a secret kept only from Bush and his administration. It is fully transparent to the rest of the world.

By way of example, take a short peek at what went down during Bush's press conference today:

QUESTION (Mike):
You said yesterday in your statement that the North Korean nuclear test was unacceptable. Your chief negotiator for the six-party talks said last week that North Korea has a choice of either having weapons or having a future. When you spoke a month or so ago to the American Legion, you talked about Iran and said, there must be consequences for Iran's defiance, and we must not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. I am wondering, sir, your administration has issued these kinds of warnings pretty regularly over the last five years, and yet these countries have pursued their nuclear programs. I'm wondering if you -- what is different about the current set of warnings, and do you think the administration and our government runs a risk of looking feckless to the world by issuing these kinds of warnings regularly without response from the countries?
THE PRESIDENT:
That's a fair question. First of all, I am making it clear our policy hasn't changed. It's important for the folks to understand that we don't continually shift our goals based upon polls or -- whatever.

See, I think clarity of purpose is very important to rally a diplomatic effort to solve the problem. And so I try to speak as clearly as I can and make sure there's no ambiguity in our position. I also found that's a pretty good way to help rally a diplomatic effort that I believe will more likely work.

I know this sounds -- I'm just saying it over and over again, but it's -- rhetoric and actions are all aimed at convincing others that they have an equal stake in whether or not these nations have a nuclear weapon, because I firmly believe, Mike, that - that is the best strategy to solve the problem. One has a stronger hand when there's more people playing your same cards. It is must easier for a nation to hear what I believe are legitimate demands if there's more than one voice speaking. And that's why we're doing what we're doing.

And to answer your question as to whether or not the words will be empty, I would suggest that, quite the contrary, that we not only have spoken about the goals, but as a result of working together with our friends, Iran and North Korea are looking at a different -- a different diplomatic scenario.

. . . . And my answer is that I believe the Commander-in-Chief must try all diplomatic measures before we commit our military. And I believe the diplomacy is -- we're making progress when we've got others at the table. . . .
And so on. The transparency of our America's decline is clear to all when the word Feckless is pronounced in a Presidential press conference with impunity:
feck-less /'f'kl's/ Pronunciation Key - Show Spelled Pronunciation[fek-lis] Pronunciation Key - Show IPA Pronunciation
–adjective
  1. ineffective; incompetent; futile: feckless attempts to repair the plumbing.

  2. having no sense of responsibility; indifferent; lazy.

feck·less (fkls) Pronunciation Key Audio pronunciation of "Feckless" [P]
adj.
  1. Lacking purpose or vitality; feeble or ineffective.

  2. Careless and irresponsible.
The reason why shitcan tyrants like Kim Jong Il and Omar al-Bashir are giving us the middle finger salute with impunity is that America has become a second-rate power. Only our president doesn't know this because no one in his entourage of handlers will tell him.

Monday, October 09, 2006

North Korea's Nuclear Test

International and Regional Shock and Disgust